The effects of contract-type mismatch and matching frictions on unemployment duration : evidence for Portugal by Sciulli, Dario & Menezes, António Gomes de
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Universidade dos Açores 
Universidade da Madeira 
 
 
 
CEEAplA WP No. 02/2018 
 
 
 
The effects of contract-type mismatch and 
matching frictions on unemployment 
duration: Evidence for Portugal 
 
 
Dario Sciulli  
António Gomes de Menezes 
 
 
February 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effects of contract-type mismatch and matching 
frictions on unemployment duration: Evidence for 
Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dario Sciulli 
University of Chieti-Pescara 
 
António Gomes de Menezes 
Universidade dos Açores (FEG e CEEAplA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n.º 02/2018 
fevereiro de 2018 
CEEAplA Working Paper n.º 01/2018 
fevereiro de 2018 
 
RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
The effects of contract-type mismatch and matching frictions on 
unemployment duration: Evidence for Portugal 
 
This paper analyses the impact of matching frictions in the Portuguese labour 
market on individual unemployment hazard rates and unemployment durations. 
The coexistence of permanent contracts and temporary contracts in the 
Portuguese (dual) labour-market is akin to a matching friction, with a contract-
type mismatch between jobseekers who have a strong preference for permanent 
contracts, whereas firms, in turn, prefer to offer temporary contracts. The paper 
uses a rich micro dataset which allows to compute a time and space varying 
contract-type mismatch index, over 85 local labour markets, identified by job-
centers of the Portuguese Public Employment System. Employing discrete time 
hazard models and a stock-flow matching mechanism, we find that local labour 
markets with higher contract-type mismatch rates are characterized by lower 
hazard rates, especially for job-seekers searching for a permanent contract, and 
higher exit rates via own means instead of via the job-center. Employing a sub-
sample of uncensored spells and regression models, the data show that longer 
unemployment duration is a price to be paid to hedge against contract mismatch. 
Improving the desirability of temporary contracts and the information about local 
contract-type mismatch rates may reduce matching frictions and average 
unemployment durations due to contract-type mismatch. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of matching frictions in the Portuguese labour market on individual 
unemployment hazard rates and unemployment durations. The coexistence of permanent contracts and 
temporary contracts in the Portuguese (dual) labour-market is akin to a matching friction, with a contract-
type mismatch between jobseekers who have a strong preference for permanent contracts, whereas firms, 
in turn, prefer to offer temporary contracts. The paper uses a rich micro dataset which allows to compute a 
time and space varying contract-type mismatch index, over 85 local labour markets, identified by job-
centers of the Portuguese Public Employment System. Employing discrete time hazard models and a stock-
flow matching mechanism, we find that local labour markets with higher contract-type mismatch rates are 
characterized by lower hazard rates, especially for job-seekers searching for a permanent contract, and 
higher exit rates via own means instead of via the job-center. Employing a sub-sample of uncensored spells 
and regression models, the data show that longer unemployment duration is a price to be paid to hedge 
against contract mismatch. Improving the desirability of temporary contracts and the information about 
local contract-type mismatch rates may reduce matching frictions and average unemployment durations 
due to contract-type mismatch. 
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1. Introduction 
 Since the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called labour market reforms “at the margin”, marked by the 
introduction of temporary (and flexible) contracts, in countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, led to 
the emergence of dual labour markets where good jobs (permanent contracts) and bad jobs (temporary 
contracts) co-exist, and to labour market performances with high unemployment rates and high 
unemployment durations. The co-existence of permanent contracts and temporary contracts gives rise to a 
possible contract-type mismatch, where job-seekers predominantly prefer permanent contracts, whereas 
firms offer mainly temporary contracts. This contract-type mismatch may be naturally perceived as a 
matching friction and, consequently, may lead, per se, to longer unemployment duration. Hence, a labour 
market reform, designed with a primary intention to increase labour market flexibility, may have the 
unintended effect of leading, via this contract-type mismatch effect, to longer unemployment duration.  
Our paper sheds light to this important phenomenon by looking at the Portuguese situation. We 
investigate the role that matching frictions, due to contract-type mismatch, have in explaining 
unemployment hazard rates in a dual labour market where good jobs and bad jobs coexist. In particular, we 
analyse the role that contract-type expectations and labour market mismatch – job-seekers preferring 
permanent contracts over temporary contracts while firms prefer the opposite – play in increasing 
unemployment duration. 
Since the 1990s labor market analysis has largely used matching functions in search and match 
frameworks (Mortensen 1987). Matching functions allow researchers to investigate the role of frictions in 
the labor market in explaining the existence of (frictional) unemployment and labor market effectiveness 
in matching unemployed workers with available vacancies. 
As highlighted by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), frictions derive from various sources. For 
example, they depend on imperfect information about potential trading partners, absence of perfect 
insurance markets, congestion from large numbers, among other factors. Recently, most contributions 
devoted to estimating matching functions focused on the role of heterogeneity of job-seekers in explaining 
frictions in the matching process. An important argument put forward by such studies is that failure to 
consider the heterogeneity of job-seekers may lead to a misspecification of the estimating matching function 
and, concomitantly, to biased estimates of the estimating parameters and to misleading inferences on search 
elasticities. Several authors (e.g. van Ours and Ridder 1995; Burgess and Profit 2001) found evidence of 
job competition between different skill groups and between employed and unemployed job-seekers. Fahr 
and Sunde (2001) find heterogeneity in matching technologies across members of different ages and 
education groups, indicating the importance of disaggregating the matching function to explain the inner 
workings of the labour market and to avoid the loss of important information. Hynninen and Lahtonen 
(2007) find that wider heterogeneity of job-seekers in terms of their educational levels increases the 
importance of frictions in the matching process.  
However, matching frictions may also arise from other sources, including labour market reform. 
Reforms “at the margin” – which introduced temporary contracts and were meant to reduce labour market 
rigidity – may constitute a potential source of matching frictions. The role of temporary contracts in the 
labour market is manifold. Certain authors (e.g. Ichino et al. 2005) emphasize their role in making it easier 
for workers to enter in the labour market and, in some cases, for workers to access permanent jobs. 
However, several studies3 highlighted possible negative effects from temporary employment with respect 
to traditional permanent relationships, contributing to rationalize the existence of segmented labour markets 
divided into primary and secondary sectors and, specifically, a segmentation in good and bad jobs4. 
Permanent jobs (good jobs) feature better working conditions, employment stability and good prospects of 
career advancements. Temporary jobs (bad jobs), in turn, are associated with lower wages, lower job 
security and impediments to career advancements (Amuedo-Dorantes 2000). In a dual labour market, where 
good and bad jobs coexist, it is likely that one will find job-seekers having strong preferences for permanent 
contracts while firms may offer temporary contracts, since firms may use this contractual form to easily 
adjust their workforce to business cycle conditions or simply to reduce expected labour costs. Therefore, a 
labour market characterized by a homogenous supply side, with most unemployed workers searching for a 
permanent job, and a heterogeneous demand side, where temporary and permanent job offers coexist, may 
involve a high degree of mismatch, and, hence, high average unemployment duration. In fact, it is likely 
that individuals looking for a permanent job will tend to first refuse offers if they are for temporary jobs 
and only after a certain time they will start accepting those temporary job offers if said individuals do not 
find a suitable permanent job meanwhile. 
                                                 
3 For example, Jimeno and Toharia (1993), Dolado, Garcia-Serrano and Jimeno (2002), and Gagliarducci 
(2005). 
4 See Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2007) for a theoretical framework on dual employment protection 
legislation. 
Our paper tests the hypothesis that higher contract-type mismatch leads to higher unemployment 
duration. To that end, we estimate a matching function using Portuguese data on individual transitions from 
unemployment to employment or employment to employment. Our empirical strategy consists in estimating 
individual reemployment probabilities with hazard models, as it allows for more flexible specifications of 
the matching function when compared to estimates of an aggregate matching function, since hazard models 
allow for a wide range of distributional forms of unemployment durations. In addition, estimating individual 
reemployment probabilities allows us to control both for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual level, which are only implicitly considered in an aggregate matching function. 
Despite the advantages of using hazard models to estimate matching functions, only a few studies in 
the literature have done so. For example, Lindeboom, van Ours and Renes (1994) investigated the link 
between matching functions and hazard models to study the relative effectiveness of alternative search 
channels. Petrongolo (2001) used hazard function specifications to test the empirical relevance of the 
constant returns to scale hypothesis in the matching technology. Other studies estimated hazard functions 
to explore the individual determinants of unemployment duration, but they did not investigate the matching 
technology underlying the matching process (Devine and Kiefer 1991). 
We follow the literature and allow two possible approaches in estimating the matching functions: the 
random matching and the stock-flow matching models 5. Broersma and van Ours (1999) argue that the 
estimates of the degree of returns to scale in the matching technology depend on the data for active job-
seekers and posted vacancies used and emphasize the importance of looking at comparable measures for 
flows and explanatory stocks. Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) argue, in turn, that part of the instability of 
estimated matching functions derives from problems of misspecification, due to the assumption of random 
search, rather than a stock-flow matching technology. In our case, we use data from job-centers and the 
stock-flow approach is a better representation of the matching mechanism, since the existence of a 
matchmaker (i.e. the job-center) makes it unlikely that the same job may be re-offered to the same 
unemployed worker, as allowed by the random matching approach. 
                                                 
5 In a random matching set up the unemployed workers randomly select a vacant job from the pool of 
existing vacancies and apply for it. Under the stock-flow matching technology, at the time an individual 
becomes unemployed he samples the existing stock of vacancies for a suitable job. If he fails to find a 
suitable match among the existing stock of vacancies, then he must wait to eventually be matched with the 
flow of new vacancies and he does not re-apply to the previously searched stock of old vacancies. 
 We use a sample drawn from the IEFP (Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional) dataset, 
the public entity responsible for Portuguese public job placement centers, for the period from 1998 to 
December 2002. This dataset provides information about personal and job-related characteristics of all 
individuals who registered in the Portuguese job-centers and allows to construct spells of individual 
unemployment duration and, quite interestingly, to identify the destination contract (if permanent or 
temporary). In addition, the dataset allows us to construct stocks and flows of unemployed job-seekers and 
vacancies offered for each month at the job-center level. The dataset also contains information about 
vacancies, enabling us to determine the number of vacant jobs available for each month at the job-center 
level. The IEFP data provide information about the contract type sought by unemployed workers and the 
contract type offered by firms. Therefore, it allows both to control the direct effects of the desired contract 
on the hazard rates toward multiple destination states and to construct an index6 of the degree of the 
heterogeneity found between contracts searched and contracts offered which we use to understand the 
effects of such contract mismatch on unemployment duration. We estimate a competing risks discrete time 
hazard model with a log-log specification. We adopt a piece-wise constant baseline hazard where 
unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be Gaussian distributed. The heterogeneity between contract-type 
desired by job-seekers and contract-type offered by firms is approximated by a mismatch index, which we 
include in the hazard model. The mismatch index is calculated at the job-center level and it thus reflects 
local labor market aggregate information; consequently, it is a valid regressor. Finally, auxiliary regression 
models have been adopted to test the stability of declared contract preferences and to investigate the 
association between unemployment duration and the probability of incurring in contract mismatch. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 describes 
contract type preferences. Section 4 introduces our index for contract-type mismatch. Section 5 presents 
the econometric model. Section 6 discusses the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 We use an IEFP dataset that provides information on individuals registered at job-centres in 
(Mainland) Portugal from 1997 to 2002. The IEFP is the agency responsible for running the public 
employment services, and it is a division of the Ministry of Labour and Solidarity. The IEFP is responsible 
for job brokering, vocational guidance, administering employment subsidies, vocational training, 
                                                 
6 The index varies over time and across job-centers. 
apprenticeship training and being registered at a job-center is necessary to collect unemployment benefits 
(see Addison and Portugal, 2002). The IEFP dataset includes information about job vacancies offered by 
firms. The original sample containing information on individuals is composed by more than 3 million of 
observations. To avoid computational problems, we drew a randomized sub-sample equal to 10% of the 
original sample7. The IEFP dataset provides (daily) information about the date of registration at the job-
center and the date of placement, making it possible to identify (multiple) spells of unemployment 
durations. Our duration analysis focuses on unemployment spells starting since 1998 to have at our disposal 
complete information on all covariates considered. Spells without the date of placement are considered 
censored. However, individuals may drop out of the job-centers if they fail to present themselves at the job-
centers control interviews. We eliminate from our sample spells that terminate in failure to report to the 
above-mentioned control interviews to avoid misleading identification of censored unemployment 
durations. To make our results, on the one hand, more readable in economic terms, and, on the other, easily 
comparable to previous studies found in the literature, unemployment duration is analysed monthly rather 
than a daily basis. 
 We only consider individuals aged 16 to 60 years old, for whom all information with respect to all 
the covariates considered is available. This selection leaves us an unbalanced panel composed by 164627 
spells and 133234 individuals. We remark that more than 81% of individuals only experiment one spell of 
unemployment in our samples. This is mainly due to the (1) quite long duration of unemployment spells 
which characterizes the Portuguese labour market and to the (2) short period analysed in this paper (60 
months); both factors concur to explain the high percentage of censored spells in our sample (about 62%).  
 We consider a plethora of personal and job-related characteristics to control for observed 
heterogeneity at the individual level. Males and females are analysed separately. Tables 1a and 1b contain 
descriptive statistics.  
<< Table 1a >> 
<< Table 1b >> 
To be more specific, we control for the following individual characteristics: age, introduced in a non-linear 
way, marital status, disability status, number of dependent persons in the household and educational level. 
We also control for job related characteristics. We introduce a variable indicating if the individual is looking 
                                                 
7 Descriptive statistics of variables contained in the original IEFP dataset and descriptive statistics of our 
randomized sample are available upon request. 
for his or her first job, meaning that he or she has no previous work experience, and a dummy indicating if 
the individual is employed at the outset of the job-search (on-the-job search). We consider a set of dummy 
variables indicating the motivation of the registration at the job-center. These dummy variables flag if the 
individual: was formerly a student; finished his or her educational career; finished a training period; was 
dismissed; resigned and if the individual registered because of the termination of a temporary contract; the 
base category dummy is constituted by individuals with no previous job experiences. We also control for a 
set of dummy variables indicating the occupation of the individual, distinguishing between managers, 
supervision activities and specialists, technicians, administrative workers, service workers, agricultural and 
fishing workers, blue collars, and individuals without specific occupations (interpreted here as no 
qualifications). Two variables are introduced to control if the individuals received unemployment or youth 
benefits or underwent a training period during the registration at the job-center. Year dummies referring to 
the beginning of the unemployment spell are also considered. Regional dummies are introduced to control 
for possible specific regional labour markets effects. As anticipated, according to the job-search theory 
framework, the probability of accepting a job offer is related to the expected wage distribution, and, hence, 
we introduce the mean wage offered by firms, evaluated monthly at the job-center level. Labour market 
tightness variables are also introduced and are evaluated monthly at the job-center level. To implement the 
stock-flow matching mechanism, we use stock and flow values of unemployed workers and vacancies in 
the following way. The IEFP data provide daily information of gross inflows of unemployed workers and 
vacancies that allow us to construct the monthly magnitude of gross inflows of labour market tightness 
variables and to reconstruct their stock values. To construct stock values, we use information from the 1997 
IEFP dataset, hence at the starting of the period analysed we have at our disposal the accumulated flow 
values until December 1997. The stock flow approach is implemented using time-varying labour market 
tightness variables, under the hypothesis that individuals look at the pool of vacancies only in the first round 
(one month) of their search process, and, afterwards, look at the gross inflow in the following rounds 
(months) of the search process. Tightness of the labour market expressed in terms of stock values (V/U) is 
about 0.075, while it is about 0.47 if expressed in gross flow terms (v/u). These differences are strongly 
suggestive that mean unemployment duration far exceeds mean vacancy duration, a result in line with other 
studies in the literature.  
 
3. Contract-type preferences  
According to the IEFP information 98% of job-seekers are looking for a permanent contract, while just two 
thirds of vacant jobs offer a permanent relationship. This is indicative of different preferences about 
contract-type between job-seekers and firms. A first consequence of this dyscrasia is that some job-seekers 
may accept a contract-type different from the desired one. Table 2 reports the destination contract of the 
job-seekers according to the declared desired contract. Among individuals looking for a permanent contract 
just 69% of males effectively find a permanent job, while this percentage decreases to 63% among females. 
Among individuals looking for a temporary contract 46% of males effectively find a temporary job, while 
this percentage increases to 57% among females. 
<< Table 2 >> 
What can explain this different attitude towards permanent/temporary contracts? From a job-seeker 
perspective, permanent jobs may be preferred to temporary ones as permanent contracts feature better 
working conditions, employment stability and good prospects of career advancement (e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes 2000). From a firm perspective, temporary contracts mat be preferable because of different 
reasons. For example, Brencic (2009) highlights that firms may prefer to hire workers by temporary 
contracts to minimize costs from bad matches. Table 3 reports estimates of a probit model informing us 
about the determinants of preferences for permanent contract in 1998-2002 IEFP data.  
<< Table 3 >> 
Another question to be addressed in our analysis concerns the stability of contract preferences. In fact, while 
the great majority of job-seekers may declare to prefer a permanent contract, they may revise their 
preferences over time as they learn about labour market conditions (namely contract-type attached to vacant 
jobs). This is important because the effectiveness of contract mismatch, and hence its effect on matching 
frictions and unemployment duration, crucially depends on the rigidity of the individual contract 
preferences. There are at least two types of hypothesis for which rigidity may be questioned: 1) 
superficiality and 2) preference revision. Under the first case, unemployed workers superficially declare to 
look for a permanent contract, but they are prone to accept a temporary contract if offered. A second 
hypothesis is that job-seekers indeed look for a permanent contract, but they are willing to revise their 
preferences to avoid an unacceptable lengthening of unemployment duration8. Obviously, in case one of 
the previous hypotheses is verified the reliability of the declaration about contract type preferences and, 
                                                 
8 The hypothesis of superficiality is an extreme case of the hypothesis of preference revision: the job-seeker 
revises his/her preference immediately, just when the first contract mismatch takes place.  
thus, of the mismatch index to identify contract mismatch and its effect on unemployment duration could 
be questioned. However, for the sub-sample of job-seekers accepting a job-offer attached to a contract-type 
different from the declared preferred contract-type, the observed unemployment duration will be included 
in the support [tmin, tmax]. Specifically, t = tmin in case the hypothesis of superficiality is verified, while t=tmax 
in case both the previous hypothesis (superficiality and preference revision) are not verified. Given these 
premises, we suggest a rigidity index (r) which measures the rigidity of the contract preferences:  
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Unfortunately, IEFP data does not provide information to test directly the hypothesis formulated above, nor 
to measure the rigidity index. The hypothesis of superficiality is tested running a multinomial logit model 
to uncover if the declared preference for permanent contracts affects the outcomes of the job-search period, 
i.e. finding a permanent job, finding a temporary job, finding a job by own means, and experiencing a 
censored spell (our base-category). In case we find evidence of a significant impact of the explanatory 
variable (job-seekers are looking for a permanent contract) on the probability of finding a permanent job 
rather than a temporary one, it would be suggestive that the declared contract-type preferences matter in 
determining the contract-type attached to the job founded. In this case the hypothesis of superficiality is 
rejected. Conversely, if the preference for permanent contracts does not explain the contract-type of the job 
accepted, the hypothesis of superficiality is not rejected. Table 4 reports estimates of the multinomial logit 
model, where in the first column we report alternative outcomes. 
<< Table 4 >> 
According to multinomial logit estimates, the hypothesis of superficiality is rejected: looking for a 
permanent contract increases the probability of finding a permanent job and decreases the probability of 
finding a temporary contract. 
The hypothesis of preference revision is tested using quantile regressions. According to ordinary least 
square estimates, the average impact of looking for a permanent contract (declared at the beginning of the 
search period) on the log unemployment duration is positive, possibly because of contract mismatch. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the positive association is not constant along the job-search period. The 
hypothesis of preference revision considers this possibility, i.e. job-seekers may revise their preference for 
permanent contracts in case of excessive lengthening of the unemployment duration. Empirically this 
should correspond to a decreasing effect of looking for a permanent contract on unemployment duration as 
unemployment duration increases. To test this hypothesis, we apply a quantile regression model and 
evaluate if the positive association between unemployment duration and preferences for permanent 
contracts decreases with unemployment duration.  
<< Table 5 >> 
Estimation results presented in Table 5 suggest that: 1) looking for permanent contracts increases 
unemployment duration (as suggested by the contract-mismatch hypothesis); 2) this positive association is 
decreasing along the unemployment duration distribution; this supports the hypothesis of preference 
revision. 
 
4. A heterogeneity index for contract mismatch  
The availability of data disaggregated both at the unemployed level and at the job vacancy level is an 
indispensable condition to the construction of a mismatch index. The IEFP dataset gathers information from 
85 job-centers for each month under investigation including the number of job vacancies available; 
therefore, we can analyse the labour market demand side at an appropriately disaggregated level. To 
evaluate the effects of contract-type heterogeneity - between permanent contracts searched by unemployed 
workers and permanent contracts offered by firms - on unemployment duration, we introduce an index (M, 
Mismatch Index) in the spirit of the Jackman and Roper (1987) mismatch indicator9. The mismatch index, 
measured monthly (m) at the job-centre level (j), is defined as the difference between the ratio of 
unemployed workers looking for a permanent contract and the pool of unemployed workers, and the ratio 
of permanent contracts offered by firms and the pool of vacancies: 
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M takes the value of zero (absence of heterogeneity) in case there are no unemployed workers nor vacant 
jobs with a preference for a permanent contract, or in case the percentage of unemployed workers looking 
for a PC is equal to the percentage of vacant jobs offering a PC. M takes the values of plus one or minus 
one in case of full heterogeneity. Hence, higher absolute values of M are associated with higher degrees of 
contract mismatch. 
Full positive contract mismatch (i.e. M takes value one) indicates that all unemployed workers look 
for a permanent contract and no permanent contracts are available. On the contrary, full negative contract 
mismatch, (i.e. M takes value minus one) indicates that all unemployed workers look for a temporary 
contract and no temporary contracts are available. 
The average in-sample value of M is 0.31, which represents the average value of the difference 
between unemployed workers looking for a permanent relationship (97.8% of unemployed workers) and 
the percentage of permanent jobs offered by firms (66.7% vacant jobs). Table 6 and Figure 1 illustrate the 
distribution of M values across job-centers. 
<< Table 6 >> 
<< Figure 1 >> 
A zero value of the index does not imply per se full placement of unemployed workers looking for a 
permanent contract. The index is an effective instrument to capture contract type heterogeneity, since it is 
representative of the potential mismatch at the contract level. 
 
 
5. The econometric model 
We employ duration analysis taking into consideration that the start of the job-search process 
coincides with registration at job-centers. As the dataset has interval-censored data, discrete-time hazard 
models are estimated (Prentice and Gloecker 1978). According to the hazard-model’s framework, the 
probability that a transition to employment will take place in a given interval [aj-1, aj) is conditional on the 
time already spent in unemployment and is estimated as a reduced form equation that considers the product 
of two probabilities: the probability of receiving a job offer and the probability of accepting it. The 
probability of accepting a job offer corresponds to the probability that the wage offer exceeds the 
reservation wage. The probability of leaving unemployment can vary over the unemployment spell 
according to changes in the probability of receiving an offer and the reservation wage: adopting time-
varying covariates controls for this variation. 
The probability of exiting unemployment in period j reads: 
(3)  11 |),[Pr   jjjj aTaaTh        
   
Assuming unit length intervals, the realization j of the discrete random variable T is the recorded spell 
duration. Discrete-time hazard models require that data are organized into a “sequential binary form.” The 
data form an unbalanced panel of individuals with the individual i contributing j = 1, 2, … t observations, 
where j indicates the number of periods at risk of the event10. Because some individuals transition into 
employment and possibly back into unemployment, multiple spells q = 1, 2, … Q are observable. In this 
case, to simplify the analysis, zero temporal correlation across spells is assumed.  
Hazard functions are estimated by assuming a complementary log-log specification, that may be seen 
as the discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazard model, with a piecewise 
constant baseline hazard and Gaussian11 unobserved heterogeneity12. The available data allow to identify 
the destination contract (PC or TC) only if the individual accepts a job offered at job-center level, while it 
remains unidentified if the individual leaves unemployment by own means (OM). It follows that three 
destination states (d) are possible and competing risks models are estimated. The estimated models assume 
independent competing risks13, implying that a hazard function for each destination state can be estimated 
separately by setting to zero the failures on other destinations.  
                                                 
10 To be more specific, a binary dependent variable was created. If the individual i’s survival time is 
censored, then the dependent binary variable is always zero; if the individual i’s survival time is not 
censored, then the dependent binary variable has a value of zero in the first j-1 observation and has a value 
of one in the last observation. 
11 At least for a single spell (or independent spells), Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) show that in discrete 
time hazard models, assuming Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity, misspecifying the error distribution 
only leads to an equiproportional rescaling of the covariate coefficients. 
12 Estimation results using models without unobserved heterogeneity and/or alternative baseline hazard 
assumptions are available upon request. 
13 The assumption holds if specific and alternative conditions are verified (Jenkins, 2005). 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may prevent estimation bias arising, for example, from omitted 
variables or from measurement errors in the observables. If unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, certain 
problems may arise (Jenkins 2005). For example, the absolute value of the duration dependence parameter 
in the hazard rate could be under-estimated (spurious duration dependence). The augmented hazard 
function, for each risk, is given by: 
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where X is a set of time-varying covariates, including the mismatch index, M, introduced in a non-linear 
way, β0 is the intercept, and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. Finally:  
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To estimate this model, the survival and density functions that compose the likelihood function cannot be 
conditioned on the unobserved effects. Therefore, the likelihood contributions are obtained by integrating 
the random terms out. The discrete-time likelihood function that incorporates the unobserved heterogeneity 
term is obtained by summing up the discrete-time likelihood functions of each individual i and spell q given 
by: 
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where yiqj is an indicator that assumes a value of one when the transition takes place in month j (i.e., the 
spell is uncensored) and a value of zero otherwise, and σ is the vector of unknown parameters in gu(u).  
Our benchmark estimations assume a stock-flow matching mechanism14 (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). 
Stock-flow matching is more compatible with negative duration dependence than random matching, even 
if negative duration dependence may also be explained in terms of ranking or loss of skills during 
unemployment. Positive duration dependence could be explained, for example, because of unemployment 
benefits exhaustion. 
 
 
6. Estimation Results 
                                                 
14 Random-matching mechanism has been also considered and results are available upon request 
6.1 Hazard rates and contract mismatch in local labour markets 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients from discrete time hazard models for the mismatch index 
introduced in a non-linear way. These results are obtained under a competing-risk specification, separate 
for males and females, in which we assume piece-wise constant baseline hazard (see results in Table A1), 
normally-distributed unobserved heterogeneity and controlling for a plethora of individual and job-related 
characteristics (see results in Tables A2a and A2b). The predicted hazard rates are reported as a function of 
the mismatch index in Graph 115. The left-hand-side graph refers to the competing risk analysis and reports 
the hazard rates against the mismatch index, while the right-hand-side graph illustrates the hazard rate at 
the job-center level (namely, by summing up hazard rates across individuals finding both a permanent and 
temporary job) by mismatch index. 
<< Table 7 >> 
<< Graph 1 >> 
Preliminary evidence show that hazard rates are higher for individuals finding a job by own means 
and that differences by gender are quite negligible. In this context, looking at individuals finding a job by 
own means, the hazard rates tend to be slightly convex, i.e. higher hazard rates are associated to extreme 
values of the mismatch index (high contract mismatch), and show a decreasing pattern as the index 
increases. Convexity could be a consequence of contract mismatch, i.e. where it is stronger, individuals are 
more likely to accept job offers out of the job-centers (possibly with the aim of reducing their exposure to 
contract mismatch). The declining pattern of the hazard rates possibly indicates that, in presence of positive 
contract mismatch (i.e. the percentage of individuals looking for a permanent contract is higher than the 
percentage of firms offering permanent contracts), finding a job by own means is less likely. This could be 
a consequence of a higher propensity of individuals looking for a permanent contract to wait for a permanent 
job-offer in the job-centers.  
The hazard rate for individuals finding a permanent contract follows an inverted U-shaped trend. To be 
more specific, the hazard rate is quite low in the presence of strong negative contract mismatch, but it 
increases for weak negative heterogeneity, reaching a maximum for index values between -0.5 and -0.4, 
then it decreases, reaching its minimum at full positive contract mismatch. This means that for individuals 
who find a permanent contract via the job-center, the hazard rate is negatively associated with stronger 
contract mismatch in the local labour market. With respect to individuals who find a temporary contract via 
                                                 
15 Control variables are evaluated at their average values. 
the job-center, we find that the hazard rate is close to zero for negative heterogeneity, while it increases for 
positive contract mismatch. This indicates that in local labour markets characterized by robust positive 
contract mismatch, we are more likely to observe individuals finding a temporary contract than a permanent 
contract.  
Looking at the total hazard rate at job-centers’ level (i.e. summing the hazard rates of individuals finding 
both a permanent and a temporary job), the resulting trend resembles the one observed for those individuals 
who find a permanent job via the job-center. This is because the contribution of individuals finding a 
temporary job is quite negligible. In sum, the right-hand-side graph suggests that at job-centers’ level, the 
hazard rate is higher for intermediate negative values of the mismatch index and lower for extreme values, 
with the lowest level in corresponding to of full positive contract mismatch. Integrating over these results, 
the data support the thesis that higher contract mismatch is associated with lower hazard rates. 
 
6.2 Unemployment duration and contract mismatch 
In this section we provide further evidence on the association between contract mismatch and 
unemployment duration looking at the issue from another perspective. The underlying idea is that some 
job-seekers looking for a permanent contract may refuse temporary contracts job-offers as they wait for a 
permanent contract job-offer. Empirically, we should find a negative association between probability of 
contract mismatch and unemployment duration. To look into this issue, we work on a sub-sample of the 
IEFP data, i.e. we now only consider those job-seekers for whom the exit-contract is observable and the 
contract mismatch variable may be determined (as a consequence, censored spells and those spells for 
which job-seekers find a job by own means are eliminated). Fort this data-subset, where contract mismatch 
is observed (we recall that unemployed individuals report their preferred contract type and vacancies are 
labelled if for temporary contracts or permanent contracts; finally, the data also records the type of contact 
of the match whenever a match via the job-center is formed) we estimate a pooled probit model with robust 
standard errors where the dependent variable takes value one in case of contract mismatch (the job-seeker 
looks for a permanent contract but finds a temporary job or if the job-seeker looks for a temporary contract 
but finds a permanent contract), while it takes the value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables include 
demographic and job-related characteristics, including the unemployment duration variable expressed in 
logarithmic terms. As showed in the first line of Table 8 (first row) we find a negative and significant 
relationship between the probability of mismatch and unemployment duration.  
We address possible endogeneity problems of unemployment duration and employ the two-step IV 
probit approach suggested by Newey (1987), with the following instruments: a variable indicating the 
month in which the unemployment spell ends and a variable indicating the year in which the unemployment 
spell begins. All instruments suggest a very strong effect of the instrumented variable (Table 8, third row).  
<< Table 8 >> 
The validity of these instruments is tested by the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-square test 
under the null hypothesis that the used group of instruments is valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the 
error term in the structural equation. Both for males and females the test does not reject the null hypothesis 
(Table 9). Then we apply both the Blundell-Smith (1986) and the Wald test of exogeneity under the null 
hypothesis that the instrumented variable is exogenous (Table 9). The procedure considering for 
endogeneity confirms the existence of a negative and significant association between the probability of 
mismatch and unemployment duration (Table 8, second row). On average, job-seekers are prone to accept 
longer unemployment duration to avoid contract mismatch; it follows that contract mismatch acts as a 
source of matching frictions in a dual labour market, where permanent and temporary contracts co-exist 
and job-seekers have strong preferences for permanent contracts.  
<< Table 9 >> 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper tests the hypothesis that higher labour market mismatch, defined as heterogeneity between 
contract-type sought by job-seekers and contract-type offered by firms, leads to longer unemployment 
duration. In this sense, labour market mismatch, as found in a dual labour market where permanent contracts 
(good jobs) and temporary contracts (bad jobs) co-exist, acts as a matching friction and may lead, per se, 
to longer unemployment duration. In these circumstances, better information on contract-type availability 
may lead to more effective job-search strategies at the individual level, who may revisit their expectations 
in a timely and informed way, avoiding, thus, excessive exposure to long unemployment duration due to 
this form of matching friction. 
Our mismatch index measures the degree of contract-type mismatch between declared preferences of 
job-seekers and jobs offered by firms at job-center level and assesses the impact of contract-type mismatch 
on unemployment duration. The reliability and the stability of the declared preferences for a specific 
contract-type are tested using both multinomial logit and quantile regression models. Our tests suggest that 
the individual declared preferences are stable and informative; nevertheless, and as expected, individuals 
may revise their initial preferences in case such preferences lead to a certain lengthening of the 
unemployment spell. 
Results from a discrete-time competing risk hazard model under a stock-flow matching mechanism 
suggest a significant impact of contract-type mismatch at job-centers level on individual hazard rates. 
Among individuals finding a permanent contract the hazard rate is lower for extreme values of the mismatch 
index, with the hazard rate reaching its lowest level when full positive contract mismatch occurs. In 
addition, local labour markets characterized by positive values of the mismatch index are associated with a 
higher incidence of exiting unemployment by accepting a temporary contract, as individuals hedge their 
position against a low likelihood of finding a permanent contract. Finally, extreme values of the mismatch 
index, especially negative values, are associated with a higher probability of finding a job by own means, 
suggesting that in presence of high contract-type mismatch individuals look for a job outside the job-
centers.  
We focus on the sub-sample of individuals who find a job via the job-center to investigate if 
experiencing longer unemployment duration may lead individuals to indeed secure their preferred contract 
type. This could be indicative that individuals are prone to lengthen their unemployment duration if doing 
so gets them to find their desired contract. Adopting an instrumental variable probit model, we find evidence 
that longer unemployment duration is associated with a lower incidence of contract mismatch, in the sense 
that the job-seeker secured a job of his or her declared preferred type. As a result, the existence of contract-
type mismatch increases unemployment duration as individuals may rationalize be willing to pay a price in 
terms of prolonged unemployment, to secure their preferred contract type.  
Our work indicates that the Portuguese labour market is characterized by substantial contract-type 
mismatch: job-seekers have a strong preference for permanent contracts while firms offer both permanent 
and temporary contracts. Job-seekers may revise their preferences and are also prone to accept temporary 
jobs, but this contract-type preference revision is not instantaneous: declared desired contracts explains the 
exit contract-type and individuals with longer unemployment duration experience lower contract mismatch, 
with extended unemployment duration being the price to pay to avoid exit contract-type mismatch. It 
follows that contract-type mismatch is akin to a matching friction and is associated with longer average 
unemployment duration. The underlying motives behind contract-type mismatch may possibly lie in the 
undesirability of some temporary contracts because of their characteristics, including possible negative 
effects on career advancements for some workers on temporary-contracts. Improving temporary workers 
conditions and their labour market perspective could improve the desirability of temporary contracts, 
contributing to reduce matching frictions and average unemployment duration because of contract-type 
mismatch. Workers who are duly informed about actual contract-type mismatch observed at the job-center 
level may formulate search-strategies which are rational, including search-strategies which may involve 
revising preferences with respect temporary-contracts. It may also be the case that some workers 
overestimate their own individual probability of finding a permanent-contract, despite the level of contract-
type mismatch observed in their local labour market. This overestimation may be associated with a well-
documented cognitive bias (Kahneman, 2015), with individuals systematically overestimating their own 
ability and relative position with respect the overall distribution. In this sense, better information on 
contract-type mismatch, coupled with policies which render temporary-contracts more attractive, are likely 
to increase unemployment exit rates and reduce average unemployment duration.      
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Figure 1. Distribution of the Heterogeneity Index 
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
Graph 1. Predicted hazard rates and Mismatch Index 
Competing risk analysis by mismatch index Hazard rates at job-centres level (exit on 
PC+TC) by mismatch index 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
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Table 1a. Descriptive statistics: Male sample 
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b. Descriptive statistics: Female sample 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 32.790 12.200 33.553 12.826 28.042 9.857 30.345 10.705 32.833 11.009
Married 0.404 0.491 0.403 0.490 0.303 0.460 0.310 0.463 0.457 0.498
Disabled 0.010 0.101 0.011 0.106 0.010 0.099 0.010 0.099 0.008 0.088
No dependent persons 0.663 0.473 0.675 0.468 0.723 0.447 0.683 0.465 0.606 0.489
1 dependent person 0.152 0.359 0.146 0.354 0.124 0.330 0.139 0.346 0.176 0.381
2 dependent persons 0.118 0.323 0.111 0.314 0.100 0.300 0.111 0.315 0.143 0.350
3 or more dependent persons 0.068 0.251 0.067 0.250 0.052 0.223 0.066 0.249 0.074 0.262
Max 6 year of education 0.453 0.498 0.454 0.498 0.442 0.497 0.453 0.498 0.454 0.498
9 years of education 0.221 0.415 0.221 0.415 0.231 0.421 0.243 0.429 0.212 0.409
11-12 years of education 0.260 0.439 0.252 0.434 0.297 0.457 0.272 0.445 0.266 0.442
More than 12 years of education 0.066 0.249 0.072 0.259 0.031 0.172 0.032 0.176 0.068 0.252
Employed 0.033 0.178 0.034 0.182 0.050 0.218 0.038 0.191 0.022 0.148
First job 0.165 0.371 0.187 0.390 0.232 0.422 0.134 0.341 0.091 0.288
Student 0.065 0.247 0.073 0.260 0.090 0.286 0.065 0.247 0.037 0.189
Ex-student 0.073 0.260 0.084 0.277 0.106 0.308 0.049 0.215 0.038 0.191
End of training period 0.016 0.125 0.015 0.123 0.022 0.146 0.014 0.118 0.016 0.125
Dismissed 0.180 0.385 0.174 0.379 0.179 0.384 0.122 0.327 0.206 0.405
Resigned 0.129 0.335 0.144 0.351 0.117 0.321 0.099 0.299 0.100 0.300
End of temporary contract 0.343 0.475 0.301 0.459 0.276 0.447 0.438 0.496 0.463 0.499
Other motivation 0.175 0.380 0.192 0.394 0.197 0.397 0.203 0.402 0.119 0.324
Manager-Specialist 0.074 0.262 0.084 0.278 0.022 0.147 0.013 0.113 0.075 0.263
Technical 0.112 0.315 0.119 0.324 0.083 0.275 0.066 0.249 0.111 0.314
Administrative 0.132 0.338 0.133 0.340 0.124 0.330 0.139 0.346 0.130 0.336
Services 0.100 0.301 0.097 0.296 0.106 0.308 0.154 0.361 0.099 0.298
Agricultural 0.037 0.188 0.026 0.160 0.015 0.120 0.072 0.258 0.065 0.247
Blue-collar 0.372 0.483 0.366 0.482 0.422 0.494 0.344 0.475 0.377 0.485
Other 0.193 0.394 0.209 0.407 0.210 0.408 0.213 0.410 0.140 0.347
Young benefit 0.044 0.206 0.035 0.183 0.039 0.195 0.045 0.208 0.071 0.257
Unemployment benefit 0.071 0.257 0.077 0.267 0.033 0.179 0.028 0.166 0.074 0.262
Training 0.262 0.794 0.319 0.869 0.146 0.597 0.114 0.537 0.180 0.659
Local wage 53930.8 30445.6 49243.6 32694.4 61027.1 23349.0 66841.7 20567.6 61608.3 24703.3
Norte 0.338 0.473 0.360 0.480 0.371 0.483 0.091 0.288 0.309 0.462
Centro 0.162 0.369 0.150 0.357 0.306 0.461 0.191 0.393 0.141 0.348
Lisbon 0.382 0.486 0.390 0.488 0.281 0.449 0.427 0.495 0.390 0.488
Alentejo 0.063 0.243 0.056 0.231 0.027 0.162 0.058 0.233 0.092 0.289
Algarve 0.054 0.227 0.044 0.204 0.016 0.125 0.233 0.423 0.067 0.251
Log flow unemployment 5.799 0.597 5.839 0.592 5.621 0.614 5.740 0.600 5.766 0.589
Log flow vacancies 4.481 1.018 4.460 1.028 4.546 0.892 4.710 0.953 4.478 1.038
Heterogeneity index 0.303 0.345 0.292 0.340 0.152 0.247 0.630 0.299 0.332 0.355
TC OMMale Censored PC
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Desired and destination contracts 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 31.662 11.058 32.118 11.407 28.177 9.395 32.550 11.173 31.589 10.446
Married 0.486 0.500 0.478 0.500 0.449 0.497 0.526 0.499 0.510 0.500
Disabled 0.004 0.064 0.004 0.067 0.004 0.064 0.005 0.068 0.003 0.056
No dependent persons 0.552 0.497 0.571 0.495 0.564 0.496 0.441 0.497 0.523 0.499
1 dependent person 0.234 0.423 0.218 0.413 0.234 0.423 0.280 0.449 0.263 0.440
2 dependent persons 0.156 0.363 0.151 0.358 0.148 0.355 0.200 0.400 0.164 0.370
3 or more dependent persons 0.058 0.234 0.060 0.238 0.054 0.227 0.079 0.269 0.050 0.218
Max 6 year of education 0.450 0.497 0.453 0.498 0.437 0.496 0.492 0.500 0.436 0.496
9 years of education 0.188 0.391 0.188 0.391 0.203 0.402 0.191 0.393 0.181 0.385
11-12 years of education 0.267 0.442 0.261 0.439 0.308 0.462 0.233 0.423 0.275 0.447
More than 12 years of education 0.096 0.294 0.098 0.297 0.052 0.223 0.084 0.278 0.108 0.310
Employed 0.037 0.189 0.040 0.196 0.050 0.219 0.029 0.168 0.027 0.163
First job 0.188 0.390 0.218 0.413 0.234 0.423 0.122 0.327 0.109 0.312
Student 0.067 0.251 0.076 0.264 0.086 0.280 0.059 0.235 0.042 0.200
Ex-student 0.083 0.276 0.098 0.297 0.106 0.308 0.047 0.211 0.044 0.205
End of training period 0.024 0.153 0.020 0.141 0.024 0.152 0.019 0.136 0.035 0.184
Dismissed 0.157 0.364 0.156 0.363 0.170 0.376 0.116 0.320 0.164 0.370
Resigned 0.098 0.298 0.111 0.315 0.100 0.301 0.067 0.250 0.071 0.257
End of temporary contract 0.354 0.478 0.295 0.456 0.293 0.455 0.519 0.500 0.489 0.500
Other motivation 0.195 0.396 0.222 0.416 0.204 0.403 0.164 0.371 0.129 0.336
Manager-Specialist 0.083 0.276 0.097 0.295 0.023 0.150 0.014 0.119 0.086 0.281
Technical 0.044 0.205 0.048 0.213 0.028 0.166 0.015 0.123 0.046 0.210
Administrative 0.201 0.401 0.202 0.402 0.213 0.410 0.160 0.366 0.204 0.403
Services 0.277 0.448 0.278 0.448 0.321 0.467 0.284 0.451 0.256 0.437
Agricultural 0.055 0.229 0.027 0.163 0.024 0.154 0.155 0.362 0.117 0.321
Blue-collar 0.114 0.317 0.115 0.319 0.166 0.372 0.080 0.271 0.099 0.298
Other 0.217 0.412 0.244 0.430 0.221 0.415 0.174 0.379 0.155 0.362
Young benefit 0.051 0.220 0.038 0.192 0.044 0.204 0.065 0.246 0.083 0.277
Unemployment benefit 0.088 0.283 0.093 0.290 0.046 0.208 0.045 0.207 0.102 0.302
Training 0.309 0.828 0.380 0.907 0.236 0.730 0.156 0.591 0.188 0.654
Local wage 55389.3 29411.7 51139.1 31799.5 62399.4 21939.3 65461.7 19000.9 61405.2 24956.5
Norte 0.318 0.466 0.360 0.480 0.357 0.479 0.078 0.268 0.248 0.432
Centro 0.167 0.373 0.161 0.367 0.297 0.457 0.147 0.355 0.142 0.349
Lisbon 0.364 0.481 0.364 0.481 0.286 0.452 0.364 0.481 0.394 0.489
Alentejo 0.089 0.284 0.070 0.256 0.043 0.202 0.180 0.385 0.132 0.339
Algarve 0.062 0.241 0.045 0.207 0.017 0.128 0.231 0.421 0.084 0.278
Log flow unemployment 5.754 0.608 5.806 0.600 5.623 0.584 5.621 0.628 5.701 0.615
Log flow vacancies 4.452 1.048 4.449 1.033 4.547 0.908 4.505 1.029 4.413 1.131
Heterogeneity index 0.314 0.349 0.290 0.340 0.165 0.256 0.619 0.314 0.363 0.361
Female Censored PC TC OM
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Determinants of looking for a Permanent contract 
Censored Censored
38885 936
63.33% 68.42%
Own means Own means
15032 288
66.76% 66.67%
PC TC PC TC
5166 2320 78 66
69.01% 30.99% 54.17% 45.83%
Censored Censored
59088 1396
61.57% 63.89%
Own means Own means
23398 541
63.43% 68.57%
PC TC PC TC
8507 4982 107 141
63.07% 36.93% 43.15% 56.85%
MALE
22518
36.67%
Uncensored
36887
38.43%
97.82% 2.18%
97.77% 2.23%
248
31.43%
Employment-center
13489
36.57%
FEMALE
95975 2185
Uncensored
789
36.11%
Employment-center
31.58%
Employment-center
144
33.33%
Looking for a PC Looking for a TC
7486
33.24%
Employment-center
Looking for a PC
Uncensored
Looking for a TC
61403 1368
Uncensored
432
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Multinomial logit model: testing the hypothesis of superficiality  
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Age 0.017 0.008 ** 0.022 0.007 ***
Age square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ***
Married -0.030 0.037 0.051 0.024 **
Disabled -0.118 0.107 -0.257 0.116 **
1 dependent person 0.058 0.043 0.050 0.028 *
2 dependent persons 0.061 0.051 0.028 0.034
3 or more dependent persons -0.113 0.056 ** 0.043 0.049
9 years of education -0.029 0.032 -0.003 0.027
11-12 years of education -0.073 0.031 ** -0.009 0.025
More than 12 years of education -0.047 0.053 0.019 0.036
Employed -0.050 0.068 0.105 0.055 *
First job 0.125 0.075 * 0.080 0.055
Student -0.364 0.079 *** -0.257 0.060 ***
Ex-student -0.098 0.081 0.010 0.061
End of training period -0.131 0.098 0.068 0.075
Dismissed 0.181 0.049 *** 0.163 0.038 ***
Resigned -0.024 0.045 0.033 0.038
End of temporary contract -0.035 0.037 -0.033 0.029
Manager-Specialist 0.103 0.055 * -0.004 0.040
Technical -0.034 0.043 0.065 0.049
Administrative 0.036 0.042 0.070 0.032 **
Services 0.070 0.047 0.024 0.028
Agricultural -0.187 0.068 *** 0.047 0.054
Blue-collar 0.090 0.035 *** 0.013 0.039
Young benefit 0.287 0.073 *** 0.092 0.045 **
Unemployment benefit 0.423 0.058 *** 0.268 0.037 ***
Training -0.021 0.016 -0.008 0.012
Local wage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ***
Norte 0.683 0.035 *** 0.726 0.029 ***
Centro 0.305 0.036 *** 0.398 0.030 ***
Alentejo 0.464 0.069 *** 0.400 0.047 ***
Algarve 0.422 0.063 *** 0.444 0.045 ***
Log flow unemployment -0.183 0.025 *** -0.182 0.020 ***
Log flow vacancies 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.008 *
Year 1998 0.390 0.080 *** 0.650 0.066 ***
Year 1999 0.375 0.083 *** 0.585 0.068 ***
Year 2000 0.360 0.088 *** 0.627 0.072 ***
Year 2001 0.070 0.092 0.337 0.076 ***
Constant 2.245 0.207 *** 2.093 0.166 ***
Male Female
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
Table 5: Quantile regression: testing the hypothesis of preference revision 
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Mismatch index by employment-center 
Outcomes Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Permanent 0.497 0.119 *** 0.378 0.120 *** 0.643 0.101 *** 0.521 0.101 ***
Temporary -0.172 0.129 -0.333 0.131 ** -0.189 0.090 ** -0.361 0.091 ***
Own means 0.233 0.068 *** 0.146 0.069 ** 0.014 0.051 -0.054 0.052
Year dummies
Male Female
No Yes No Yes
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
OLS estimates 0.120 0.031 *** 0.164 0.024 ***
First quintile 0.288 0.087 *** 0.288 0.118 **
First quartile 0.223 0.083 *** 0.223 0.105 **
Median 0.154 0.050 *** 0.143 0.036 ***
Third quartile 0.150 0.043 *** 0.182 0.043 ***
Fourth quintile 0.103 0.035 *** 0.130 0.023 ***
Male Female
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 7. Hazard rates and contract mismatch in local labour markets 
Region Job-centre Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Region Job-centre Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Viana do Castelo 0.421 0.254 -0.008 0.791 Caldas da Rainha 0.156 0.141 -0.059 0.661
Braga 0.064 0.151 -0.046 0.780 Abrentes 0.089 0.143 -0.024 0.977
Fafe 0.005 0.040 -0.034 0.209 Santarem 0.422 0.247 -0.041 0.910
Guimaraes 0.016 0.040 -0.026 0.189 Tomar 0.506 0.168 0.179 0.990
Vila Nova de Famaliçao 0.145 0.172 -0.007 0.827 Torres Novas 0.138 0.150 -0.015 0.972
Amarante 0.099 0.128 -0.052 0.458 Amadora 0.641 0.449 -0.010 1.000
Matosinhos 0.000 0.026 -0.069 0.087 Cascais 0.556 0.393 -0.033 0.968
Penafiel -0.003 0.023 -0.054 0.152 Conde Redondo 0.343 0.198 -0.044 0.731
Porto 0.421 0.224 -0.032 0.804 Picoas 0.431 0.319 -0.099 0.952
Povao do Varzim/Vila do Conde 0.013 0.063 -0.032 0.442 Loures 0.488 0.262 -0.017 0.992
Santo Tirso -0.011 0.024 -0.077 0.068 Moscavide 0.091 0.141 -0.052 0.538
Vila Nova de Gaia 0.016 0.048 -0.026 0.291 Torres Vedras 0.034 0.073 -0.030 0.398
Vila Real 0.377 0.253 -0.069 0.923 Vila Franca de Xira -0.011 0.067 -0.230 0.257
Chaves 0.012 0.084 -0.034 0.556 Almada 0.611 0.162 -0.015 0.982
Bragança 0.006 0.029 -0.021 0.164 Barreiro 0.147 0.265 -0.119 0.885
Macedo de Cavaleiros 0.124 0.183 -0.048 0.720 Montijo 0.045 0.128 -0.157 0.403
Mirandela 0.065 0.124 -0.051 0.616 Setubal 0.832 0.120 0.258 0.986
Torre de Moncorvo 0.029 0.069 -0.043 0.345 Salvaterra de Magos 0.678 0.249 -0.028 0.971
Felguiras -0.005 0.010 -0.035 0.019 Alcobaça 0.114 0.100 -0.020 0.424
Porto Ocidental -0.005 0.012 -0.045 0.025 Sintra 0.546 0.229 -0.455 0.784
Basto 0.458 0.410 -0.027 1.000 Alcantara 0.018 0.052 -0.053 0.192
Lamego 0.297 0.185 0.000 0.819 Benfica 0.781 0.175 -0.014 0.994
S. Joao de Madeira 0.004 0.023 -0.028 0.158 Seixal 0.576 0.158 -0.102 0.889
Arcas de Valvedez 0.337 0.206 0.000 0.857 Alacer do Sal 0.785 0.247 -0.050 1.000
Barcelos 0.011 0.047 -0.030 0.304 Sines 0.260 0.285 -0.036 0.794
Maia 0.073 0.181 -0.018 0.979 Elvas 0.582 0.244 0.049 0.978
Valongo 0.043 0.119 -0.022 0.662 Portalegra 0.505 0.292 -0.021 0.961
Gondomar 0.077 0.152 -0.056 0.789 Estremoz 0.644 0.256 0.052 0.989
Valença 0.019 0.063 -0.015 0.432 Evora 0.338 0.209 -0.005 0.812
Aveiro 0.229 0.195 -0.008 0.992 Beja 0.787 0.245 0.000 1.000
Agueda 0.055 0.075 -0.037 0.326 Ourique 0.053 0.156 -0.036 0.817
Coimbra 0.400 0.233 -0.016 0.970 Ponte de Sor 0.601 0.330 -0.054 1.000
Figueirada Foz 0.595 0.159 -0.020 0.984 Montemor o Novo 0.458 0.290 -0.018 1.000
Lousa -0.031 0.246 -0.449 0.668 Moura 0.811 0.275 -0.011 1.000
Leiria 0.134 0.112 -0.041 0.370 Faro 0.874 0.142 0.218 1.000
Marinha Grande 0.198 0.141 -0.029 0.517 Portimao 0.883 0.152 -0.032 0.989
S. Pedro do Sul 0.003 0.018 -0.022 0.080 Vila Real de Santo Antonio 0.864 0.117 0.476 0.992
Viseu 0.003 0.059 -0.090 0.275 Loule 0.870 0.147 0.000 0.960
Guarda -0.005 0.029 -0.065 0.099 Lagos 0.617 0.223 -0.011 0.993
Castelo Branco 0.450 0.237 -0.005 0.882
Covilha 0.015 0.050 -0.028 0.207
Arganil 0.167 0.093 -0.014 0.493
Figueiro dos Vinhos 0.185 0.144 -0.048 0.629
Tondela 0.674 0.173 -0.006 1.000
Seia 0.022 0.061 -0.036 0.280
Serta 0.074 0.095 -0.018 0.422
Pinhel 0.271 0.235 0.000 0.803
Norte
Centro
Lisboa
Alentejo
Algarve
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
Table 8. Probability of mismatch and unemployment duration 
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
Table 9. Over-identification and exogeneity tests 
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Table A1 Estimation of duration dependence parameters (stock-flow matching) 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Heterogeneity index -1.049 0.176 *** 5.700 0.295 *** -0.222 0.098 **
Heterogeneity index square -1.141 0.242 *** -3.248 0.282 *** 0.175 0.111
Heterogeneity index -1.011 0.135 *** 4.878 0.207 *** -0.239 0.079 ***
Heterogeneity index square -1.000 0.182 *** -2.661 0.196 *** 0.309 0.088 ***
MALES
FEMALES
Permanent Contract Temporary Contract Own Mean
Coef. r.s.e. mfx Coef. r.s.e. mfx
-0.071 0.020 *** -0.024 -0.060 0.016 *** -0.022
Coef. s.e. mfx Coef. s.e. mfx
-0.116 0.023 *** -0.093 0.018 ***
Instruments:
Ending month of the spell 0.085 0.001 *** 0.081 0.001 ***
Starting year of the spell -0.087 0.001 *** -0.078 0.001 ***
Pooled probit
IV Probit model
MALES FEMALES
Chi2 P-value > Chi2 Chi2 P-value > Chi2
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum Chi2 test 0.46 0.497 1.02 0.313
Chi2 P-value > Chi2 Chi2 P-value > Chi2
Smith-Blundell test 17.69 0.000 15.72 0.000
Wald test 17.70 0.000 15.74 0.000
EXOGENEITY TESTS                                                                                                                                                            
Null hypothesis: the specified endogenous regressor may be treated as exogenous
MALES FEMALES
OVERIDENTIFICATION TEST                                                                                                                                      
Null hypothesis: instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation 
MALES FEMALES
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2a. Estimation of covariates (stock-flow matching): male sample 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
1-3 months 1.225 0.055 *** 1.316 0.086 *** 0.621 0.034 ***
4-6 months 0.886 0.057 *** 1.114 0.088 *** 0.875 0.033 ***
7-9 months 0.421 0.064 *** 0.716 0.096 *** 0.504 0.035 ***
10-12 months 0.237 0.069 *** 0.357 0.109 *** 0.229 0.039 ***
13-18 months
19-24 months -0.359 0.075 *** -0.146 0.117 -0.424 0.045 ***
25-36 months -0.844 0.078 *** -0.663 0.128 *** -0.705 0.046 ***
over 36 months -1.257 0.104 *** -1.041 0.181 *** -1.176 0.065 ***
1-3 months 0.766 0.042 *** 0.657 0.057 *** 0.369 0.028 ***
4-6 months 0.710 0.042 *** 0.765 0.055 *** 0.653 0.026 ***
7-9 months 0.246 0.047 *** 0.544 0.059 *** 0.406 0.028 ***
10-12 months -0.015 0.052 0.003 0.072 0.132 0.031 ***
13-18 months
19-24 months -0.288 0.053 *** -0.333 0.075 *** -0.230 0.034 ***
25-36 months -0.650 0.054 *** -0.713 0.079 *** -0.464 0.035 ***
over 36 months -1.004 0.073 *** -1.124 0.113 *** -0.859 0.050 ***
FEMALES
base-category
base-category
Permanent Contract Temporary Contract Own Mean
MALES
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2b. Estimation of covariates (stock-flow matching): female sample 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age 0.003 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.062 0.007 ***
Age square -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ***
Married -0.009 0.053 -0.140 0.076 * 0.327 0.030 ***
Disabled -0.336 0.160 ** -0.375 0.249 -0.295 0.109 ***
1 dependent person 0.012 0.059 0.068 0.085 0.035 0.032
2 dependent persons 0.057 0.066 0.160 0.096 * 0.051 0.036
3 or more dependent persons -0.068 0.082 0.161 0.114 -0.097 0.045 **
9 years of education 0.059 0.040 0.016 0.061 -0.044 0.026 *
11-12 years of education 0.013 0.042 -0.104 0.062 * -0.052 0.026 **
More than 12 years of education -0.331 0.094 *** -0.352 0.137 *** -0.111 0.044 **
Employed 0.164 0.082 ** 0.030 0.134 -0.176 0.067 ***
First job -0.054 0.090 -0.309 0.158 * -0.320 0.073 ***
Student 0.147 0.096 -0.070 0.173 -0.101 0.082
Ex-student 0.265 0.094 *** 0.079 0.177 -0.012 0.081
End of training period 0.227 0.122 * 0.137 0.212 0.563 0.085 ***
Dismissed 0.159 0.055 *** -0.039 0.088 0.625 0.036 ***
Resigned 0.129 0.061 ** -0.023 0.094 0.240 0.041 ***
End of temporary contract 0.063 0.050 0.149 0.070 ** 0.786 0.032 ***
Manager-Specialist -1.455 0.112 *** -1.824 0.195 *** 0.450 0.047 ***
Technical -0.570 0.064 *** -0.796 0.105 *** 0.289 0.040 ***
Administrative -0.413 0.057 *** -0.252 0.085 *** 0.243 0.038 ***
Services -0.261 0.059 *** -0.157 0.084 * 0.089 0.041 **
Agricultural -0.733 0.132 *** 0.585 0.115 *** 0.826 0.052 ***
Blue-collar -0.034 0.042 -0.214 0.068 *** 0.202 0.031 ***
Young benefit -0.013 0.082 -0.060 0.117 0.428 0.040 ***
Unemployment benefit -0.230 0.088 *** -0.511 0.141 *** 0.213 0.040 ***
Training -0.293 0.026 *** -0.348 0.045 *** -0.284 0.014 ***
Local wage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Norte 0.021 0.042 -0.594 0.088 *** -0.165 0.026 ***
Centro 0.612 0.045 *** 0.321 0.073 *** -0.179 0.033 ***
Alentejo -0.477 0.102 *** -0.756 0.117 *** 0.389 0.043 ***
Algarve -0.073 0.133 0.452 0.087 *** 0.154 0.050 ***
Log flow unemployment -0.371 0.023 *** -0.399 0.044 *** -0.081 0.017 ***
Log flow vacancies 0.209 0.020 *** 0.208 0.031 *** 0.122 0.011 ***
Constant -4.258 0.242 *** -7.479 0.412 *** -6.228 0.167 ***
Permanent Contract Temporary Contract Own Mean
 
Source: own elaboration on IEFP data 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
